MINUTES OF THE RULES CHANGE PANEL
30th PANEL MEETING
HELD ON TUESDAY 9 JANUARY 2007 AT 10.05AM
AT ENERGY MARKET CO. PTE LTD
9 RAFFLES PLACE #22-01
REPUBLIC PLAZA, SINGAPORE 048619

Present: Dave Carlson  Lim Ah Kuan
         Robin Langdale  Tay Swee Lee
         Kng Meng Hwee  Philip Tan Pei Lip
         Dr. Daniel Cheng  Francis Gomez
         Henry Gan

Absent with Low Boon Tong  Dallon Kay
Apologies:

In Attendance: Paul Poh  Poa Tiong Siaw
(EMC) Teo Wee Guan  Janice Leow
Wang Jing

1.0 Notice of Meeting

The Chairman called the meeting to order at 10.05am. The Notice
and Agenda of the meeting were taken as read.

2.0 Confirmation of Minutes of the 23rd Rules Change Panel Meeting

The Minutes of the 29th Rules Change Panel meeting held on
Tuesday, 14 November 2006 was tabled and taken as read.

There being no amendments to the Minutes, the Rules Change
Panel unanimously accepted and approved the Minutes.

2.1 Mr. Lim Ah Kuan informed the Panel that MSSL had conveyed its
concerns to EMC by email on 16 November 06 on the Default Levy
after the panel members have unanimously in its meeting of 14th
November 06 voted to go ahead with the "Net creditors to bear the
Default Levy" proposal.

The Chairman requested EMC to circulate the email sent by MSSL
and EMC’s response to the MSSL to the Panel.

(Note: The email was circulated to Panel members on 10 January
2007, the contents are reproduced in section 9 of this minutes)
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3.0 PSO Proposed Expenditure and Fees for the Fiscal year FY 07/08 commencing 1 April 2007

Mr. Kng Meng Hwee informed the Panel that he would abstain from the discussion on the PSO’s Budget.

The Panel invited Ms. Glenda Ong (Head Admin – PSOD) to the meeting.

Ms. Ong presented the PSO Proposed Expenditure and Fees for the Fiscal Year FY07/08 commencing 1 April 2007.

The Panel reviewed and noted the PSO’s proposed budget. The Panel also noted that the RCP’s comments are based solely on the information provided to the RCP in the proposed budget.

The RCP noted that the cost (or fee) per MWh of energy traded for the next fiscal year (i.e. FY07/08) is estimated to be $0.1881/MWh. This represents a 13% reduction over that of the current fiscal year (i.e. FY06/07). Such a reduction will ultimately benefit consumers.

The RCP is of the opinion that in future when the gas market commences, the PSO should consider allocating costs associated with monitoring and planning of the piped natural gas system to the gas market rather than the electricity market.

The RCP asked that in future budgets, the PSO provide the Panel with associated costs on gas monitoring & planning function and also provide greater visibility on charges for the gas and electricity functions.

EMC advised that it would circulate the submission on the points discussed above to Panel members for confirmation prior to issuing to the EMA.

The Panel thanked Ms. Ong for her presentation.

4.0 EMC Budget for FY 2006/2007 – Paper No. EMC/RCP/24/2006/01

Mr. Dave Carlson, Chairman of RCP informed the Panel that he would confine his comments during the discussion on EMC’s Budget and Proposed Fees.

The Panel invited Mr. Luke Peacocke, Ms. Lim Ching Lee and Ms. Rashmi Thakur of EMC to the meeting.

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The Panel was informed that under the Market Rules and EMC’s Market Licence, EMC is obliged to consult the Rules Change Panel on its Proposed Budget and Fees for the financial year 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008, prior to submitting it to the Regulator for approval.

The Panel was requested to consider and provide its views on the Budget so that EMC may take these into account in seeking formal approval from EMA.

EMC is also required to publish the proposed Budget and Fees to invited interested parties to make submissions to the RCP on the Budget. The Panel was also informed that EMC had published the Budget and Proposed Fees for FY2007 on its website and received no comments.

4.1 **Summary of EMC’s Five Year Strategic Business Plan**

The Panel was informed that EMC’s overriding business goal is to achieve sustainable returns to shareholders while delivering high levels of customer service and playing a key supportive role in the liberalisation of Singapore’s energy market. This is achievable if the following goals are attained:

1. Retain and renew the NEMS Operator Licence
2. Enhance EMC’s service delivery to NEMS market participants
3. Expand into new markets

In reply to Mr. Langdale’s query, Mr. Peacocke informed that it is conditional on EMC’s market Licence for EMC to seek the Regulator’s approval to expand into new market activities and these should be beneficial to the NEMS market. This is a new area that EMC intends to develop over the next 5-year period.

4.2 **EMC’s Regulatory Framework**

The Panel was informed that EMC operates under an Economic Regulation Framework approved by the EMA which comprises of a:

- revenue-cap price regulation regime; and a
- performance-based regulation regime known as PIMS.

This framework is designed to incentivise EMC to make cost efficiencies while maintaining service quality.

The revenue cap for FY2005/06 provides the basis for the revenue caps FY2006/07 and FY2007/08 with annual adjustments to reflect a CPI-X factor.
EMC applied to the EMA (in accordance with criteria approved by the EMA) for an adjustment to the FY2006/07 and FY2007/08 revenue caps. The multi-year adjustment (MYA) requested was $0.467m to take account of certain costs that were not incurred in FY2005/06 but will be required in subsequent years. The FY2007/08 budget was prepared on the basis that the EMA will approve EMC’s request.

The budget for FY2007/08 has been prepared with an expected PIMS bonus of $0.375m, representing a 70 percent achievement of targets. This assumption has an implied level of stretch on the Company to continue to meet ever increasing EMA performance requirements.

4.3 The table below summarises EMC’s Budget and Proposed Fees for FY2007/08.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget FY 07/08 $’000</th>
<th>Proj FY 06/07 $’000</th>
<th>Budget FY 06/07 $’000</th>
<th>Actual FY 05/06 $’000</th>
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<tr>
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<td>28,151</td>
<td>27,970</td>
<td>27,938</td>
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<td>Operating Expenses</td>
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<td>Manpower</td>
<td>7,704</td>
<td>7,995</td>
<td>8,770</td>
<td>8,257</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other operating expenses</td>
<td>16,423</td>
<td>14,293</td>
<td>15,205</td>
<td>15,105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Operating Expenses</td>
<td>24,127</td>
<td>22,288</td>
<td>23,975</td>
<td>23,362</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit before tax</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>5,863</td>
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<td>4,576</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
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<td>(1,173)</td>
<td>(799)</td>
<td>(915)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit after tax</td>
<td>3,631</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>3,661</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fees in $ MWh*</td>
<td>0.3791</td>
<td>0.3723</td>
<td>0.3699</td>
<td>0.3695</td>
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</table>

* EMC’s revenue is levied based on the quantity of energy traded (IEQ and WEQ). The basis used is 6.30 TWh per month.

The Panel noted the contents of the Budget for FY 2007/08.

4.4 RCP Comments

4.4.1 The Panel requested that EMC review the expense level for the RCP financial representative to ensure that it is correct. EMC will revert to the Panel.

4.4.2 On the Revenue Cap, the Panel noted that, in accordance with EMC's regulatory framework, the EMA is responsible for approving EMC’s revenue cap and any annual adjustments to it.
4.4.3 The Panel was informed that for FY2008/09, the Panel will consider the appropriate level of EMC’s revenue cap. Thereafter, during the years covered by that revenue cap, the Panel suggested that it is better for the RCP to focus on adjustments to the revenue cap and exogenous cost items.

4.4.4 The Panel noted that EMC’s revenue has increased from FY2005/06 – FY2007/08 due to the annual CPI-X adjustment. There is a general expectation from the Panel that there will be a reduction in EMC’s revenue when the revenue cap is re-set in FY2008/09 as was the case when EMC’s revenue cap was re-set in FY2005/06.

4.4.5 The Panel also requested that when projecting the market operator fee for FY2007/08, EMC should take into account future electricity demand growth and use the same basis as the PSO to project the system operator fee.

4.4.6 The Panel requested that it would be useful for EMC to clarify in its budget documentation that the capital budget of $0.5m to cater for unforeseen and ad hoc rule changes will only be used in accordance with decisions made by the RCP.

EMC stated that it would circulate the RCP Report on EMC’s Budget and Proposed Fees for FY2007/08 to the Panel for confirmation before issuing to the EMC Board and the EMA.

The Panel thanked Mr. Peacocke, Ms. Lim and Ms. Thakur for their attendance.

5.0 Matters Arising

The Panel noted that the follow-up actions were completed on the matters arising as outlined.

6.0 Summary of Outstanding Rule Changes

The Panel noted the contents of the paper.

7.0 Monitoring List

The Panel noted the contents of the paper.
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8.0 Appointment of Technical Working Group
(Paper No. EMC/RCP/30/2007/03)

The TWG consists of seven members from the following:

1. 4 experts based on nominations from market participants
2. 1 person nominated by the PSO
3. 1 MCE expert nominated by EMC
4. Chairperson nominated by EMC

EMC had called for nominations from market participants and the PSO to form the next TWG.

EMC recommended the Panel appoint the following to the Technical Working Group:

1. Mr. Lai Shang Voon, Sembcorp Cogen Pte Ltd
2. Mr. Sim Meng Khuan, PowerSeraya Ltd
3. Mr. Tan Cheng Teck, Senoko Power Ltd
4. Mr. Tony Tan Kia Shuan, Tuas Power Ltd
5. Dr. Kang Cheng Guan, PSO
6. Mr. Lu Feiyu, EMC
7. Mr. Paul Poh, EMC (as Chairperson)

The Panel asked EMC as to why the nominee from SP PowerAssets Ltd was not a recommended candidate. Mr. Paul Poh said that based on the current membership structure of the TWG, knowledge about the grid would be provided by the PSO representative. If the Panel felt that the TWG would benefit with a representative from SP PowerAssets, Mr Paul Poh suggested that the TWG membership be expanded to include a representative of SP PowerAssets. The Panel debated the issue and concluded that it would be beneficial to appoint the SP PowerAssets nominee as the MCE deals with constraints on transmission systems and opinions from the PowerGrid would be useful.

The Panel agreed to expand the membership of the Technical Working Group to include a nominee from the transmission licensee.

The Panel also supported the appointment of Mr. Chan Hung Kwan of SP PowerGrid Ltd to the Technical Working Group.

The Panel appointed the following to the TWG, for the period 21 January 2007 to 20 January 2009:

1. Mr. Lai Shang Voon, Sembcorp Cogen Pte Ltd
2. Mr. Sim Meng Khuan, PowerSeraya Ltd
3. Mr. Tan Cheng Teck, Senoko Power Ltd
4. Mr. Tony Tan Kia Shuan, Tuas Power Ltd
The Panel was informed that at the 29th RCP Meeting, the Panel voted to support the proposal to allocate any default levy only to net creditors. EMC was tasked to propose changes to the text of the market rules to reflect the proposal.

The Key changes and Rationale to the proposed rule change are as follows:

- Non-defaulting Market Participants ≠ Levy bearing Market Participants (Multiple Sections)
  - Rationale: Under the proposal, only net creditors bear default levies. The term “levy bearing market participant” is used to exclude non-defaulting MPs who are net debtors.

- Formulae for allocation of default levy (S9.6.1, S9.10.4)
  - Rationale: Under the proposal, any default levy is to be shared between levy bearing MPs only. Hence the allocation formulae must exclude invoice amounts of MPs who are not liable.

- Multiple default levy ≠ debt recovery levy (multiple sections)
  - Rationale: debt recovery levy is a more apt description of the coverage of the levy.

- Changes to definitions in Chapter 8 (various sections)
  - Rationale: changes required for new terms introduced and name changes to defined terms.

Comments were also received from market participants:

From Tuas Power:
- “If the proposal of charging default levy to net creditors is supported, then EMC prudential requirements from retailers should be increased accordingly.
- This issue should be considered jointly with the review of retailer’s prudential requirements.”

EMC Response:
- The current default levy arrangement is flawed going by design principles. The level of default risk is not relevant.
- In principle, who bears residual default risk should not be linked to the size of the risk.
Content of email from SP Services Ltd received on 16 November 2006:

- “SPS would like to reiterate that we are agreeable with the proposed rule change that the net creditors should be bearing the default levy. However, we disagree with the definition of “net creditor” under the proposed rule where net creditor is defined as MSSL with positive net invoice amount in the wholesale market. We think it is more equitable that a thorough flow-through analysis of the vesting credits/debits is to be done in determining the ultimate net creditors in the market.

- Under our electricity license, the MSSL is to provide assistance to the EMA in the prevention of misuse of market power. To fulfill its obligation, the MSSL enters into vesting contracts with gencos on behalf of consumers as a whole. We wish to emphasize again that MSSL is not the sole beneficiary of vesting contracts credits. Vesting contracts are revenue neutral to the MSSL, which means vesting credits received by MSSL or vesting debits paid to gencos by MSSL in the wholesale market are completely passed through to/recovered from the retail market. All retailers as well as contestable consumers who purchase electricity from MSSL receive a direct distribution of vesting credits/debits through their monthly invoice. Non-contestable consumers receive or pay for vesting credits/debits indirectly via published tariffs. In view of our role as a conduit of vesting contract, it is inequitable that MSSL be defined as the net creditor and made to bear fully the default levy.

- By going ahead with the proposed rule, we feels that MSSL is being treated unfairly for the following reasons:

  All MPs should receive equitable treatment and no party should be disadvantage at the other’s expense and Vesting contract settlement is pass through, it is unfair that SPS bear the default levy not due to its own load.”

EMC’s email response to MSSL on 22 November 06

EMC confirmed the following to the MSSL:

1. The RCP has deliberated on the Default Levy issue over several meetings.
2. MSSL’s concerns described have been made known during these meetings.
3. In response, the RCP had requested EMC to explore with MSSL options for taking vesting contract credits into account when imposing a default levy.
4. Accordingly, EMC worked with MSSL to table two options to the RCP. They were both not supported due to high cost of implementation.
5. The RCP then asked for further study on the option of withholding vesting credits when a default occurs. At the 29th RCP meeting, the RCP noted that this was also not feasible.

6. The RCP then considered two options:
   (A) MSSL calculates and submits VCD to EMC for inclusion in Wholesale Market Settlement Statements (Option 1 discussed at the 28th RCP Meeting). This option brings Vesting Contract Settlement Amounts between MSSL and Retail MPs into wholesale market settlement. MSSL will calculate these amounts and provide them to EMC for inclusion in wholesale settlement statement. It would delay the issue of preliminary settlement statement by 1 business day and comes at an estimated cost of $860,000.
   (B) Impose default levy only on net creditors (based on the existing wholesale market invoice amounts)

7. Under Option A, the Panel considered that the cost of system changes cannot be justified given the unlikelihood of an event where a retailer default occurs and MSSL is a creditor. Thus, the RCP concluded that Option B be adopted. The RCP has tasked EMC to present the rules changes to implement Option B.

8. The process from here is to present the text of rule changes to the RCP to confirm that the drafting reflects the intent of Option B. We will be attaching MSSL’s written comments and all discussions on matters arising at various RCP meetings in the RCP report to the EMC Board.

9. The report would then be considered by the EMC Board for adoption. Under section 5.3.16.3 of Chapter 3 of the Market Rules, the EMC Board may decide against adopting a change if it “gives a market participant, a class of market participants or one or more market support services licensees an undue preference in the wholesale electricity markets”.

10. If the EMC Board adopts the change, it shall be submitted to the EMA for approval. Under Section 5.8.1.1 of Chapter 3 of the Market Rules, the EMA shall approve a change unless it is satisfied that the change “unjustly discriminates in favour of or against a market participant or class of market participants”.

The Panel was informed that EMC will provide the MSSL’s concerns to the EMC Board for consideration.

MSSL indicated that they are working with EMA on the ability of passing through the default levy. The panel also suggested that MSSL and EMC continue to explore if there are other solutions pertaining to the vesting credits.

The Panel supported EMC’s recommendation and to make the necessary recommendation to the EMC Board for adoption.
10.0 Mixed Integer Program Based Modeling of Regulation Constraints
(Paper No. EMC/RCP/30/2007/263)

At the 29th RCP meeting, RCP members considered EMC’s proposal and tasked EMC to study the following two issues:

- In a trading period T, because a “trapped” generator would be scheduled outside its regulation band in the MIP solution, it would then not be able to qualify to provide regulation for period T+1. Is it possible that the MIP approach would result in insufficient usable regulation offer for period T+1?

- When a “trapped” generator is scheduled below its RegulationMin, it would not qualify to provide regulation for the next period. In this case, is it possible that this “trapped” generator would be permanently “stuck” below its RegulationMin?

Issue 1, EMC is of the opinion that this should not be an issue because

- the proposed MIP approach creates the same regulation schedules for the “trapped” generators as the current approach.

- in the MIP solution, as the energy schedules of more than one generator could be affected, we cannot conclude the regulation providers is more or fewer for period T+1 in the MIP solution.

- the generators which provide regulation for period T would still be able to provide regulation for period T+1.

Thus, it cannot be concluded that the MIP approach will necessarily result in insufficient regulation providers for period T+1. If such regulation insufficiency happens, it should be left to the market to respond.

Issue 2, EMC confirmed that the “trapped” generators would not be permanently “stuck” outside the regulation band because Gencos can always change their energy offers so that the “trapped” generators can be dispatched back into its regulation band.

The Panel was further notified that EMC had conducted testing for the period from November 6 to November 11 and the day November 16 to see how regulation price would be impacted. During the testing period, there was no regulation price limit violation observed which means there was no regulation shortage.
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Mr. Kng asked whether MIP solution lowers high regulation prices. EMC explained that it may not.

EMC recommended that the RCP support the rule modification to introduce MIP to resolve the issue of trapped generators.

The Panel supported EMC’s recommendation and to make the necessary recommendation to the EMC Board for adoption.

{Mr. Francis Gomes and Mr. Koh Kah Aik left the meeting at 12.20pm}

11.0 Review of Price Revision
(Paper No. EMC/RCP/30/2007/04)

Mr. Henry Gan of EMC presented a detailed outline of EMC’s Daily Price Check to the Panel and also provided the procedures for price checks conducted by EMC and the daily price check checklist.

The Panel was informed that under the market rules, EMC is to provide confirmation by 12 noon each day as to whether the prices determined for the previous dispatch day are final or provisional. The Pricing team will perform price sanity check on a daily basis between 8 am to 12 noon. Among other things, the Pricing team also looked out for are abnormal prices in relation to:

- Price deviation from demand / requirement
- Extreme high or low prices

Mr. Philip Tan queried that the abnormal price determination may vary from person to person performing the price sanity checks. Mr. Gan clarified that the price check is done in accordance to a set of procedures using a checklist and is reviewed by the immediate supervisor such that consistency in abnormal price determination is maintained. The Panel was also informed that re-runs are done in accordance to market rules with proper internal governance process in place. EMC will constantly look for better solutions to improve its efficiency in performing price checks.

Mr. Robin Langdale asked about the number of instances where re-runs need to be conducted after prices were flagged for investigation. Mr. Gan replied that in most cases after detail investigation re-runs were not required because prices could be explained.

The Panel was provided with the following Daily Price Check Process as well as the Daily Price Check Checklist.
{Mr. Lim Ah Kuan left the meeting at 12.50pm}

As there was a lack of quorum, the Chairman informed the remaining members of the Panel that the rest of discussion on price revision be deferred to the next Meeting.

There being no other matters, the meeting ended at 12.40pm with a vote of thanks to the Chair.

Dave E Carlson
Chairman

Minutes taken by:
Eunice Koh
Senior Executive - Corporate Secretariat
# National Electricity Market of Singapore

## Market Analyst: Trading Date:
- Check Started at Date: Time: Trading Periods: 1 to 48
- Reviewed By: Date: Time:

### 4.1 Check Schedule Publication

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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Check Issue</th>
<th>Check Approval</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dispatch Run (DPR)</td>
<td>half hour</td>
<td>1 minute later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Ahead Run (DAR)</td>
<td>half hour</td>
<td>5 minutes past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week Ahead Run (WAR)</td>
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### 4.2 Check Run Status for DPR

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<td>Authorised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>Authorisation pending</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cancelled</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Authorisation denied</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Plot and Check Prices for DPR

#### 4.3.1 Bus Prices
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.2 MNN Prices
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.3 USEP
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.4 Primary Reserve
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.5 Secondary Reserve
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.6 Contingency Reserve
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

#### 4.3.7 Regulation
| Cause | Rate Appendix
|-------|---------------|
|       | Rate Appendix

### 4.4 Additional Checks for DPR:

1. Warning / Violation*
2. Outage Schedule
3. Revised Standing Capability Data
4. Security Constraints
5. Load Shedding Files
6. Inter-Unit Offering Submissions

* Contact Trader regarding ramp-rate violation

### 4.5 Check Advisory Notices

#### 4.5.1 Check Advisory Notices

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSO Advisory</th>
<th>DPR Advisory</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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### 4.6 Price Confirmation Checks for DPR:

#### 4.6.1 Price Confirmation Checks for DPR:

1. Energy Shortfall
2. CVP
3. Failed Pending Missing Late Run
4. Missing Security Constraints
5. Missing Load Shedding Files
6. Missing Inter-Unit Offering Submissions
7. Abnormal Prices
8. Other Problem with Prices (please state)

### 4.7 Price Confirmation (required by 12 noon) Issued Time

State price(s) as Final or Provisional*
*For Provisional Prices state the affected period(s) and complete a Detailed Investigation report

### 4.8 Confirm Publication of Market Information on Trading Website

#### 4.8.1 Cross-check DPR/LAR/DAR/WAR on Trading Website to MC Application

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<th>DPR</th>
<th>LAR</th>
<th>DAR</th>
<th>WAR</th>
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<table>
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<th>Reports - System: Load / Transmission Loss / USEP / Energy Shortfall</th>
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<th>Reports - Ancillary Class: Requirements / Price / Shortfall</th>
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<th>Reports - Provider Group: Ancillary Group / Price</th>
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<tr>
<th>Reports - MNN Price: Market Network node / Energy Price</th>
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<th>Reports - Security Constraints: Name / Sense / Limit</th>
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### 4.9 Confirm External Receipt of ASA Report*

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* To be verified by Assistant Market analyst on business days only latest by 4:30 pm

### 4.10 Publication

#### 4.10.1 Publication of DNN Prices

1. Upload DNN prices to Private Website

#### 4.10.2 Publication of Daily Trading Report

1. Upload Report to Private Website (with summary)
2. Upload Report to Public Website (without summary)